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IT’S NOT JUST FOR DEATH CASES ANYMORE: HOW CAPITAL
MITIGATION INVESTIGATION CAN ENHANCE
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING AND IMPROVE ADVOCACY IN
LAW SCHOOL NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE CLINICS
HUGH M. MUNDY *
INTRODUCTION
Within the last two decades, the total number of defendants facing
federal criminal charges has skyrocketed. 1
In 1995, 54,980
defendants were charged in federal courts throughout the country. 2
By 2011, that number nearly doubled to 101,149 defendants. 3 Almost
90,000 defendants—about 90-percent of those charged—entered pleas
of guilty. 4 Strikingly, only 274 defendants—less than one percent—
were acquitted after a jury trial. 5 In many states, the percentages of
criminal defendants who pleaded guilty in 2011 are very similar to the
federal totals. 6 In effect, the term “trial lawyer” in the criminal
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author
expresses his gratitude to Sheida Ahmadzadeh, Jillian Berner, Barry Chenman, Jesse
Cheng, Gina DiCello, Olympia Duhart, Jillian Kassel, Lisa Lerman, Ashley
Madonia, David Patton, Ellen Podgor, Alison Siegler, Jay Steed, and his family for
their support, encouragement, and contributions to this article.
1. See
Judicial
Facts
and
Figures,
U.S.
COURTS
(2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2011/Table505
.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. For instance, in Pennsylvania, county-by-county statistics reflect higher
percentages of guilty pleas than in federal courts. See PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING,
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defense context has become oxymoronic. A more apt characterization
is “guilty plea lawyer.”
In every case involving a guilty plea, the defendant will be
sentenced for the offense of conviction. 7 Needless to say, in light of
the enormous number of defendants who plead guilty, the effective
assistance of counsel at sentencing is vital. 8 By the same token, the
ethical and professional requirements for sentencing counsel are
considerable. 9 Under American Bar Association (“ABA”) standards,
“[d]efense counsel should present to the court [at sentencing] any
ground which will assist in reaching a proper disposition favorable to
the accused.” 10 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has long
held that the need for competent counsel may be greater at sentencing
than in the determination of guilt because at sentencing “a judge
usually moves within a large area of discretion and doubts. . . . Even
the most self-assured judge may well want to bring to his aid every

SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: ANNUAL REPORT 46 (2011), available at
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/annual-reports/2011-revised-10-112012/view In Montgomery County, 98% of the 5,521 defendants charged in 2011
entered pleas of guilty while less than 1% opted for a jury trial. Id. at 47. In Bucks
County, 98% of the 5,147 defendants charged in 2011 entered guilty pleas while less
than 1% opted for a jury trial. Id. at 46. In less populous Butler County, every one
of the 1,252 defendants charged in 2011 pleaded guilty. Id. In Illinois, between
2000-2010 (the most recent years for which data are available), the Illinois
Sentencing Policy Advisory Council reported that “trials accounted for less than 5%
of felony convictions in eighty-two of Illinois’ 102 counties; looked at the other
way, guilty pleas accounted for 95% or more of felony convictions in eighty-two of
Illinois’ 102 counties.” ILL. SENTENCING POL’Y ADVISORY COUNCIL, RESEARCH
BRIEFING UPDATE: ILLINOIS FELONY SENTENCING – A RETROSPECTIVE 4 (2012).
7. For analysis of federal criminal cases, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2011 1 (2012), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Publications/2012/FY11_O
verview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (“The United States Sentencing Commission
received information on 86,631 federal criminal cases in which the offender was
sentenced in fiscal year 2011. Among these cases, 86,201 involved an individual
offender and 160 involved a corporation or ‘organizational’ offender.”) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
8. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385-86 (2012) (affirming that
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies at sentencing).
9. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-8.1 (1993).
10. Id. § 4-8.1(b).
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consideration that counsel for the accused can appropriately urge.”11
As a result, the failure of defense counsel to investigate, prepare, and
present mitigating factors at sentencing can constitute ineffective
assistance under the Sixth Amendment. 12
Fulfilling this duty in capital cases means that the defense team
must conduct an exhaustive and meticulous investigation about
matters including the defendant’s “childhood, upbringing, education,
relationships, friendships, formative and traumatic experiences,
personal psychology, and present feelings.” 13 In turn, the evidence
unearthed during the investigation must be transformed into a
coherent, compelling, and comprehensive narrative of the defendant’s
life for the mitigation presentation. 14 However, this meticulousness
during sentencing was solely reserved for capital cases until 2005.
The professional and constitutional obligations of defense counsel
in non-capital sentencing hearings have taken on heightened
significance since the Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in United States v.
Booker. 15 In Booker, the Court declared that the mandatory United
States Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury. 16 To remedy the violation, the Booker majority rendered

11. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 178 (1946).
12. See, e.g., Grigg v. United States, 3:13-cv-00040 (Doc. No. 23) (M.D.
Tenn. July 16, 2013) (concluding that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance under the Sixth Amendment due to his failure to investigate potentially
mitigating evidence, file mitigating evidence with the court before defendant’s
sentencing hearing, or argue on behalf of defendant during the sentencing hearing);
see also Berry v. Wolfbarger, No. 08-12894, 2010 WL 2681173 (E.D. Mich. July 6,
2010).
13. Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 324 (1983).
14. Michael N. Burt, The Importance of Storytelling at All Stages of a Capital
Case, 77 UMKC L. REV. 877, 879 (2009) (“‘If there is one dominant theme that
explains [a successful defense], it is that the capital defendant’s attorney must tell a
powerful and coherent story of injustice . . . .’”) (quoting WELSH S. WHITE,
LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES
178 (2006)) (alteration in original).
15. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (expanding the role of
the court’s discretion at sentencing, and thus expanding the defense counsel’s role in
highlighting factors in the defendant’s favor at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000)).
16. Id. at 245.
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the Sentencing Guidelines “effectively advisory,” 17 holding that the
Sentencing Guidelines are only one of several factors that must be
considered at sentencing. 18 In addition to the Sentencing Guidelines,
the Court cited broad statutory factors courts should consider,
including the “history and characteristics of the defendant” and the
“nature and circumstances of the offense.” 19 Tracking the statutory
mandate, the Court reasoned that lower courts must impose sentences
that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” 20 to achieve four
essential goals: punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and
rehabilitation of the defendant. 21
While both capital and non-capital sentencing hearings call for
extensive mitigation investigation, critical differences still exist.
Notably, in capital proceedings, the story—“stripped of legalese”—is
at the heart of the sentencing. 22 This makes sense. After all, capital
sentencing hearings involve presentations to juries, not judges. 23 The
primary objective of the defense team in capital sentencing
proceedings is achieving a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole. 24 As a result, the narrative is unconcerned with legal
considerations regarding the appropriate range of imprisonment or
terms of post-release supervision.
Conversely, in non-capital federal proceedings, the defendant is
sentenced by a judge who must cite both statutory authority and
17. Id.; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 62 (2007) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (affirming the holding in United States v. Booker that the United Stated
Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory).
18. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
19. Id. at 249 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
21. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
22. Sean D. O’Brien, Death Penalty Stories: Lessons in Life-Saving
Narratives, 77 UMKC L. REV. 831, 836 (2009).
23. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (affirming the
constitutionality of bifurcated capital proceedings including a “guilt phase” during
which the jury determines the defendant’s guilt or innocence and, upon conviction, a
“penalty phase” during which the jury decides whether the defendant should be put
to death).
24. See Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 360 (1993) (“[A] capital
defense attorney’s central mission is to present the defendant’s ‘case for life’ . . . .”).
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sentencing guidelines to justify the sentence. 25 Thus, “legalese”
matters. That is, counsel in a non-capital case must link the mitigation
presentation to the corresponding statutory sentencing factors and
guidelines. 26 Without this legal tether, counsel’s narrative, even if
compelling, may not result in the desired outcome.
Non-capital defense lawyers also face pragmatic obstacles to
undertaking a “quasi-capital” mitigation investigation.
First,
mitigation investigation is costly and time-consuming. 27 Most
defense lawyers, especially public defenders, are burdened with high
caseloads and have limited investigative resources. 28 Second, noncapital defense lawyers often lack the experience and expertise of their
capital brethren to effectively identify key mitigation evidence and use
such evidence to paint a compelling portrait of the defendant at
Third, unlike the teams who represent capital
sentencing. 29
defendants, the non-capital lawyer is generally the defendant’s sole
advocate. 30
25. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46 (holding that federal courts must consider
the United States Sentencing Guidelines ranges, but also may “tailor the sentence”
according to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
26. Id.
27. Helen G. Berrigan, The Indispensable Role of the Mitigation Specialist in a
Capital Case: A View from the Federal Bench, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 819, 825-30
(2008) (discussing the “considerable amount of time” and high cost of a
comprehensive mitigation investigation).
28. See, e.g., Sequestering Justice: How the Budget Crisis is Undermining Our
Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. and the Courts of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) (statement of Hon. Julia S. Gibbons, Chair, Jud.
Conf. Comm. on the Budget) (“[T]he pace at which criminal cases requiring courtappointed counsel has continued unabated, while resources in the [Federal]
Defender
Services
program
are
diminishing.”),
available
at
http://news.uscourts.gov//sites/default/files/Judge-Gibbons-Testimony-07.23.13.pdf;
see also Donald J. Farole, Jr. & Lynn Langton, A National Assessment of Public
Defender Office Caseloads, 94 JUDICATURE 87 (2010) (reporting on the
overwhelming caseloads and budget shortfalls experienced by state and local public
defender offices).
29. See RUSSELL STETLER, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, WHY
CAPITAL
CASES
REQUIRE
MITIGATION
SPECIALISTS,
available
at
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/998934720.005 (“[L]awyers . . . generally
lack the skills to conduct life-history investigation.”).
30. See Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 952 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 1, Art. 3
Mundy Final Edit.docx (Do Not Delete)

36

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

3/24/2014 10:18 AM

[Vol. 50

For non-capital criminal defense lawyers, increasingly complex
post-Booker mitigation investigations are compounded by the everincreasing number of defendants entering guilty pleas and facing
sentencing. One method to confront both emerging challenges is the
creation of a manageable, cost-effective, and replicable mitigation
investigation model, tailored to the specific needs of non-capital
counsel. In fact, a blueprint for non-capital cases may be drawn from
the essential techniques of capital mitigation investigation.
As this article proposes, law school criminal defense clinics
provide an excellent environment to design and implement a noncapital mitigation investigation protocol based on the techniques used
in death penalty cases. From a pedagogical perspective, such a model
promotes student development of foundational lawyering skills and
values, especially in the vital area of “narrative thinking characteristic
of everyday practice.” 31 From a pragmatic standpoint, creation of a
mitigation investigation model benefits clinic clients and boosts the
likelihood that similar investigative methods will become a staple of
the student’s post-graduate practice.
Part I charts the evolution of capital mitigation investigation and
highlights recent jurisprudence signaling a movement of concepts
associated with capital mitigation to non-capital cases. Part II
provides a brief history of clinical legal education and outlines the
structure and pedagogical goals of the non-capital criminal defense
clinic. Finally, Part III explores how the use of a capital mitigation
investigative model in non-capital criminal defense clinics advances
clinical pedagogical goals.
PART I
THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL MITIGATION INVESTIGATION
Mitigation evidence in capital cases encompasses “facts about the
defendant’s character or background, or the circumstances of the
Cases] (recommending each capital defense team should consist of no fewer than
two defense attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist).
31. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 96-97 (2007) (explaining that the “twofold aspect of
professional expertise” required of lawyers is comprised of “analytical” and
“narrative modes of reasoning”).
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particular offense, that may call for a penalty less than death.” 32
Capital mitigation jurisprudence traces its origins to Furman v.
Georgia, in which the Supreme Court temporarily ended the death
penalty while planting the seeds for the growth of mitigation
evidence. 33 In Furman, a narrow and fractured majority effectively
eliminated every state death penalty statute by holding that
discretionary death penalty laws—or those which give juries the
unfettered choice to impose death—violate the Eighth Amendment’s
bar against “cruel and unusual punishment.” 34 In one of five separate
concurring opinions, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the failure of
such laws to provide meaningful sentencing guidance to jurors
resulted in the “wanton[]” and “freakish[]” imposition of death
sentences. 35 In another concurring opinion, Justice William Brennan
captured the essence of mitigation, emphasizing that the core concern
“underlying” the Eighth Amendment “is nothing less than the dignity
of man.” 36
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
post-Furman statute which separated death penalty proceedings into
two phases: a guilt stage and a sentencing phase. 37 In the initial stage,
the jury or judge determined the defendant’s guilt or innocence. 38
Upon a finding of guilt, the proceedings moved to a second phase
during which the jury or judge decided whether the defendant should
be put to death for the offense. 39 The Court concluded that the
bifurcated scheme comported with Eighth Amendment restrictions as
it contained structural mechanisms that reduced the risk of
capriciously imposed death sentences. 40
Namely, during the
32. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987)).
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[The death sentences at issue] are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual.”).
36. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-69 (1976).
38. Id. at 162-63.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 195.
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sentencing phase, the jury was limited to consideration of certain
aggravating and mitigating factors. 41 In the majority’s view, these
restrictions provided procedural safeguards to the sentencing phase
and distinguished the law from overly discretionary statutes. 42 After
Gregg, the dual guilt and sentencing phase structure established the
basic template for death penalty statutes across the country. 43
While Gregg was chiefly concerned with imposing limits on
jurors’ sentencing discretion, two companion cases dealt with the
constitutionality of statutes which eliminated discretion altogether. 44
In Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana, the Court
struck down state laws mandating death for certain offenses. 45 The
Woodson Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes offer an
unacceptable alternative to laws allowing “arbitrary and wanton jury
discretion” as they preclude “particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant.”46
Likewise, in Roberts, the Court held that a Louisiana death penalty
statute substituting “standardless jury discretion” with a “harsh[] and
inflexible[]” mandatory standard overwhelms the constitutional
requirement to “guide the jury in the exercise of its power to select
those . . . who will receive death sentences.” 47
Gregg, Woodson, and Roberts established the constitutional
framework for individualized sentencing of capital defendants.
Subsequent cases established the expansive breadth and scope of
admissible mitigation evidence. 48 In Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme
41. Id. at 196-97.
42. Id. at 196-206 (holding that appellate review of the jury’s application of
the aggravating and mitigation factors precludes the “random or arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty”).
43. See Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster’s Mental Health and Social
History: Why Capital Defense Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units
Require the Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 23, 40
(2005) (“Since Gregg, capital trials have been divided into two phases”: a “guilt or
innocence phase” and a “penalty phase.”).
44. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
45. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336.
46. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
47. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332, 334-36.
48. While the scope of mitigation has broadened since Gregg, the aggravating
factors a jury may consider at sentencing remain structured. The Supreme Court,
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Court opened the mitigation floodgates, holding that the capital jury
may consider “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.” 49 The decisions that followed
exemplified Lockett’s inclusive language, approving the use of
mitigation evidence stretching from the defendant’s early childhood to
predictors of his future conduct. 50 Indeed, the Court has continually
reiterated that a capital jury may consider a “potentially infinite”
number of mitigating factors at sentencing. 51 Concomitantly, the
Court has established a low bar for the relevance of mitigation
evidence, stating that admissibility hinges only on whether a juror
could reasonably believe the evidence to be mitigating. 52 In addition,
the Court has refused to require a “nexus” between the proffered

however, has endorsed the use of victim impact evidence during the sentencing
phase to “‘keep the balance [between mitigation and aggravation evidence] true.’”
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not bar victim
impact evidence).
49. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
50. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-17 (1982) (reversing
sentence of death due to state court’s failure to admit in mitigation evidence of the
“background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant”);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (holding that sentencing jury could
consider defendant’s “disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment
to life in prison” as relevant to consideration of a life sentence instead of death).
51. See, e.g., Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 21 (2006) (approving admission
by state court of “forward-looking” mitigation evidence as predictor of defendant’s
future conduct as one of the “potentially infinite mitigators”); Buchanan v.
Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998) (“[O]ur cases have established that the
sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider,
any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.”). But see California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (affirming use of an instruction admonishing jury not to be
“swayed by ‘mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion, or public feeling’” during sentencing phase of capital proceedings).
52. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-85 (2004) (“Relevant mitigating
evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or
circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.”)
(quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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mitigation evidence and the offense itself. 53 Together, these standards
have spawned a near-boundless mitigation universe. 54
A Primer on Capital Mitigation Investigation
As the investigation, discovery, and use of mitigation evidence is
essential in capital cases, the corresponding obligations on defense
counsel are demanding. Simply put, defense counsel must conduct a
meticulous and intensive mitigation investigation. 55 The Supreme
Court has uniformly rejected that defense counsel can make a socalled “strategic decision” to limit or abandon mitigation
investigation. 56 Likewise, counsel cannot “‘sit idly by, thinking that
investigation would be futile.’” 57 Nor can counsel rely on the client’s
representations as to the lack of mitigation evidence or “statement[s]

53. Id. at 287-89.
54. See, e.g., id. at 287 (identifying evidence of low IQ as relevant mitigating
evidence); Poyson v. Ryan, 685 F. Supp. 2d 956 (D. Ariz. 2010) (identifying
substance abuse as a relevant mitigating factor); Jones v. Polk, 401 F.3d 257, 262-64
(5th Cir. 2005) (identifying defendant’s remorse for offense as a relevant mitigating
factor); Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2005) (identifying chronic paranoid
schizophrenia as a relevant mitigating factor); Ex parte Hood, 304 S.W.3d 397, 401
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussing defense counsel’s introduction of poverty and
possible brain damage as mitigation evidence); McGowan v. Thaler, 675 F.3d 482
(5th Cir. 2012) (recognizing childhood neglect as a mitigating factor); Nelson v.
Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 316 (5th Cir. 2006) (identifying borderline personality
disorder and abandonment during childhood as relevant mitigating factors).
55. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-99 (2000) (holding that
counsel’s failure to commence mitigation investigation until a week prior to trial and
failure to discover evidence relating to defendant’s “nightmarish childhood” and
borderline mental retardation constituted ineffective assistance under the Sixth
Amendment); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381-83 (2006) (holding that defense
counsel was constitutionally ineffective due to his failure to examine a court file
relating to a prior conviction that the Commonwealth planned to use as aggravating
evidence).
56. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (citing the “well-defined
norms” set forth in the American Bar Association Guidelines in holding that defense
counsel’s “rudimentary knowledge” of his client’s personal history and failure to
expand the mitigation investigation beyond the facts in the pre-sentence
investigative report fell below both professional and constitutional standards).
57. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1021 (quoting
Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901, 910 (N.D. Miss. 1980)).
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that evidence . . . is not to be collected or presented.” 58 Instead,
counsel must undertake “extensive and generally unparalleled
investigation into personal and family history . . . begin[ning] with the
moment of [the client’s] conception.” 59
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s resounding language about
the duty to present mitigation evidence, the Court has given
comparatively little guidance as to how defense counsel should
investigate the defendant’s history, compile relevant information, or
construct a compelling sentencing presentation. 60 As a result, in the
aftermath of Lockett, “defense teams were largely at a loss to figure
out what to do with their newfound freedom.” 61 As a further obstacle,
most defense counsel lacked the time or training to meet the Court’s
new demands. 62 In light of the enormity and complexity of the
mitigation process, capital defense teams began enlisting the
assistance of “private investigators, . . . psychologists, journalists,
From these diverse
anthropologists, and social workers.” 63
backgrounds, “defense team members giving undivided attention to
the client’s life story” became known as “mitigation specialists.” 64
In 2003, the ABA updated its existing guidelines for
representation of capital defendants (hereinafter “the ABA

58. Id. at 1015; See also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 379 (counsel was not entitled to
rely on defendant’s statement that he had “an unexceptional background” as basis to
curtail mitigation investigation).
59. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1022 (quoting
Russel Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb.
1999, at 35) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and
Logic of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 848 (2008) (describing the
“unevenness” with which defense counsel undertook mitigation investigation after
Lockett).
61. Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 348
(2009) (quoting Jesse Cheng, The Capital Ethnography Project, CHAMPION, July
2006, at 53, 53) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 828 (“Lawyers are adept at legal analysis,
fitting facts to legal principles, dissecting prior jurisprudence . . . . [They] are not
trained in the communication (particularly listening) skills needed, nor perhaps do
they have the time or patience, to delve deeply into the life history of their client.”).
63. Hughes, supra note 61, at 343-44.
64. Russell Stetler, Mitigation Investigation: A Duty that Demands Expert
Help but Can’t Be Delegated, CHAMPION, Mar. 2007, at 61, 62.
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Guidelines”) and added language requiring every capital defense team
to include a mitigation specialist. 65 Mitigation specialists play several
vital roles for the defense. 66
Importantly, they “compile[] a
comprehensive and well-documented psycho-social history” of the
defendant “based on an exhaustive investigation.” 67 In addition, they
“analyze[] the significance of the information in terms of impact on
development” and “find[] mitigating themes” in the defendant’s
background. 68
Further, mitigation specialists assist in the
identification and location of experts to examine the defendant or
testify on his behalf. 69 Mitigation specialists also guide the defense
team in crafting a thorough, cogent, and persuasive story of the
defendant’s life. 70 As part and parcel of these multiple tasks,
mitigation specialists often become the primary contact for the
incarcerated client. 71 In this way, mitigation specialists are central to
earning the client’s trust and confidence, an indispensable function
that impacts virtually every aspect of representation. 72
65. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 959.
66. The duties of mitigation specialists differ based upon the demands of the
case. Thus, the following list is non-exhaustive and intended only to provide
examples of common obligations. For a closer examination of the mitigation
specialist’s diverse contributions to the defense team, see Stetler, supra note 64, at
62-63.
67. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 959; see also
Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History
Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 966 (2008) (“The fundamental duty of a mitigation specialist
is to conduct a comprehensive life history investigation of the client and identify all
relevant mitigation issues . . . .”).
68. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 959.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Cooley, supra note 43, at 49-50 (“The Court’s limitless rule
with respect to mitigation evidence enables defense counsel to construct a
comprehensive, illustrative, and life-saving social history of capital defendants.”).
71. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 960 (“The
mitigation specialist often plays an important role . . . maintaining close contact with
the client and his family while the case is pending.”).
72. See White, supra note 24, at 338 (discussing the difficulty of establishing a
“relationship of trust” between the capital client and counsel and the value of
“patien[ce],” “loyalty,” and “understand[ing] the client’s view of reality” in
overcoming mistrust); Berrigan, supra note 27, at 825 (“[Mitigation specialists]
must be able to establish rapport with . . . the client, the client’s family and
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“A comprehensive life history investigation requires the
collection, organization, and analysis of data” about the defendant. 73
This process entails two fundamental components: extensive records
collection and in-depth interviews with “almost anyone who was ever
part of the defendant’s life.” 74 Records collection is essential in
building a framework for the mitigation narrative. 75 The mitigation
specialist should obtain, as a starting point, records of the defendant’s
medical, educational, and employment history. 76 In addition, records
of the defendant’s prior incarceration or institutionalization, contact
with social services or other governmental agencies, or military
service often contain revealing historical information. 77 The scope of
records acquisition is broad, varied, and case-specific. 78 It may
encompass documents as personal as the defendant’s birth certificate
and as far-reaching as studies detailing environmental contaminants to
which the defendant, and entire communities, may have been

significant others . . . .”) (quoting Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 682
(2008) [hereinafter Supplementary Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases]) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra
note 30, at 960 (“The rapport developed in this process can be the key to persuading
a client to accept a plea to a sentence less than death.”).
73. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 966.
74. See Hughes, supra note 61, at 344 (discussing the latter fundamental
component of the defendant’s life history investigation).
75. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 966-67.
76. Cooley, supra note 43, at 55, 63-64 (Records to be obtained “include, but
are not limited to,” birth, schools, employers, military institutions, juvenile court,
prison, medical, and psychiatric records.).
77. Id.; see also Berrigan, supra note 27, at 826 (Records to be obtained
“include school records, such as academic, disciplinary, and evaluative reports;
medical records of accidents and illnesses; mental health evaluations; social services
data, including welfare, adoption, or foster care records; juvenile delinquency and
adult criminal records; employment history, military records, and any other
institutional accounts.”).
78. Additional challenges to records acquisition include the “various methods
and mechanisms for requesting records” and the process of determining the specific
waivers and releases required for the records sought. Supplementary Guidelines in
Death Penalty Cases, supra note 72, at 683. For more on this subject, see Berrigan,
supra note 27, at 825, and Cooley, supra note 43, at 61 (noting that a background in
social work is “ideal,” in part, because it “enables mitigation specialists to . . . hunt
down the necessary documentation” about the defendant).
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exposed. 79 The Supplementary Guidelines highlight the spacious
parameters of records acquisition, calling for any document that sheds
light on the defendant’s “capacity for redemption, remorse, . . .
positive acts or qualities,” or “degree of moral culpability.” 80
Interviews are similarly critical. 81 At the outset of the case, the
mitigation specialist conducts the first in a series of interviews with
the defendant. 82 The initial conversation usually entails only an
introduction and explanation of the mitigation specialist’s role on the
defense team. 83 The defendant’s ability and willingness to convey
important information may be hampered by his distrust of the
mitigation specialist, by mental illness or cognitive impairment, or by
the emotional trauma of facing a capital charge. 84 Therefore, followup interviews with the defendant are crucial. 85 From an investigative
standpoint, the ongoing process invariably yields information with
which to delve more deeply into the defendant’s background. 86 Of
equal value, multiple interviews help strengthen the defendant’s
confidence in the defense team and allow the mitigation specialist to
gain insight into the defendant’s ability to communicate, interact, and
develop interpersonal relationships. 87
79. Hughes, supra note 61, at 346.
80. Supplementary Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 72, at 679.
81. See Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 968-69; see also Berrigan, supra
note 27, at 824 (“[Mitigation specialists] must be able to identify, locate and
interview relevant persons . . . .”) (quoting Supplementary Guidelines in Death
Penalty Cases, supra note 72, at 682) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 969.
83. Id.
84. See Haney, supra note 60, at 877 (commenting on the possibility that
“certain capital defendants” will be “initially uncooperative” or “suspicious of the
interviewers’ motives” or unwilling to discuss “sensitive, personal, or painful”
information); see also Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 969 (noting that “if a
defendant’s mental illness presents difficulties between the defense team and the
client, observations, data, and insight acquired by the mitigation specialist will
inform mental health experts.”).
85. See Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 969.
86. See id. at 969-70.
87. Id. (listing additional benefits of a series of interviews, including allowing
the mitigation specialist to “observe, over time, the defendant’s gait, mental state,
affect regulation, memory, comprehension of writing and speech, adaptation to
incarceration, capacity to form interpersonal relationships, and remorse.”).
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To create an inclusive, detailed, and accurate social history, the
interview process extends far beyond the defendant’s cell. 88
Additional interview subjects typically include family members,
friends, neighbors, former employers or coworkers, and any other
individuals who may lend insight into the defendant’s background. 89
Through interviews, the mitigation specialist endeavors to learn
“everything there is to know about the defendant” and those who have
impacted his life—“even his nemeses.” 90 The interview process,
though, is fraught with obstacles. Subjects are reluctant to speak to an
advocate for the defendant in some cases, especially if the facts
surrounding the charges are shocking. 91 In addition, family members
may be loath to disclose abuse or neglect of the defendant during
childhood or adolescence. 92 The interview process rarely results in a
tidy and consistent chronology of the defendant’s life. 93 As a result,
the mitigation specialist must construct a credible and cohesive social
history from different, and sometimes conflicting, accounts. 94
Mitigation specialists’ analysis of the voluminous information
must be multi-faceted, complicated, and “painstaking.” 95 One key
objective is identification of noteworthy patterns or “mitigating
themes” in the defendant’s life around which to structure the
narrative. 96 Also critical is review of the evidence for indicators of
88. See id.; see also Hughes, supra note 61, at 344-47 (discussing the plethora
of information mitigation specialists seek to uncover).
89. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 826 (stating that the list of potential
interviewees may extend to “institutional employees” if the defendant has been
incarcerated in the past).
90. Hughes, supra note 61, at 346.
91. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 826 (noting that accusations of a “horrendous
crime” may “drive [interview subjects] away”).
92. Id. (discussing the “understandabl[e] reluctan[ce]” of family members to
“disclose maltreatment or failure”); Haney, supra note 60, at 877.
93. Haney, supra note 60, at 877 (highlighting the importance of reconciling
the “numerous facts, events, and interrelationships” into a “thematic and coherent”
account).
94. Id. at 875-76.
95. Id. at 876-77 (describing the mitigation specialist’s “emotionally
wrenching” experience of “absorbing the pain that is present in the life stories of the
persons” interviewed).
96. Hughes, supra note 61, at 346 (quoting ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty
Cases, supra note 30, at 859) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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learning disabilities, psychological disorders, or other cognitive
impairments that may affect the defendant’s competency or
necessitate evaluation or treatment by experts. 97 At times the
mitigation investigation may uncover witness accounts of the charged
offense or other evidence that proves central to the theory of the
defense. 98 Thus, the defense team must also review the mitigation
evidence for its potential trial value. 99
Construction of a “life history chronology” often serves as “the
most basic organizing tool” for various types of evidence, including
records and interview transcripts. 100
In a chronology of the
defendant’s life, “trends” or “causal factors” typically “emerge” that
provide a springboard for more detailed follow-up. 101 Another useful
compilation technique is the creation of “genograms” (also known as
“family trees”) to map the defendant’s family history and identify
common threads related to mental illness or substance abuse. 102 In
similar fashion, the development of “ecological charts” (or
“ecomaps”) can help the mitigation specialist trace societal or
environmental conditions that may have impacted the defendant’s
development. 103
The evidence must also be analyzed through the lens of the
defendant’s cultural background and heritage. 104 In many capital
97. Berrigan, supra note 27, at 827.
98. While most commonly associated with sentencing, the mitigation narrative
is also often critical during plea negotiations, at trial, or even to the determination of
a specific charge filed. Therefore, the process of constructing a full and detailed
account of the defendant’s personal history must begin “as quickly as possible.”
ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1023.
99. Id.; see also Berrigan, supra note 27, at 829 (Aside from its possible use at
trial, mitigation evidence “may even persuade the prosecution to forgo capital
punishment and settle for life imprisonment on a guilty plea.”).
100. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 973.
101. Id. (“For example, records indicating that the client’s mother drank
alcohol during her early teenage years would lead the mitigation specialist to
question the mother, her family, and friends regarding her history of alcohol
use. . . .”).
102. Id. at 974.
103. Id.
104. See Guy Ben-David, Cultural Background as a Mitigating Factor in
Sentencing in the Federal Law of the United States, 47 NO. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 1
(2011) (discussing the importance of information about a defendant’s cultural
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cases, cultivating a persuasive narrative involves debunking myths
associated with the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or religious views.105
The mitigation narrative may require an explanation of the
defendant’s struggle with assimilation into an unfamiliar community
or other “cultural dislocations.” 106
Similarly, the abuse or
maltreatment of the defendant, as detailed in the narrative, may have
roots in cultural norms or practices. 107 To this end, the ABA
Guidelines specifically recognize the impact of “cultural or religious
influence” as a possible mitigation factor. 108
Finally, the defense team must compose a mitigation narrative
through which the defendant’s life will be made real to jurors. 109 The
narrative must, of course, be “accurate” and “credible.” 110 But,
“creating a resonant mitigation case [also] requires constructive
imagination.” 111
According to pioneering mitigation specialist
background in mitigation, as stereotypes about race, culture, and ethnicity can lead
to “erroneous predictions of dangerousness” or propensity for rehabilitation).
105. Id.
106. Scharlette Holdman & Christopher Seeds, Cultural Competency in
Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 897 (2008) (quoting Mak v. Blodgett,
970 F.2d 614, 617 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 912; see also Ben-David, supra note 104, at n.96 (quoting United
States v. Gaviria, 804 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D. N.Y. 1992)) (explaining that a
woman’s criminal culpability may be affected by the coercion of a spouse, and a
“male’s control” over his spouse may be the “result” of “cultural norms”).
108. ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 30, at 1022, 1026
(“If a client is a relatively recent immigrant, counsel must learn about the client’s
culture, about the circumstances of his upbringing in his country of origin, and about
the difficulties the client’s immigrant community faces in this country.”).
109. For an insightful look into the power of the narrative in the trial context,
see John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a
Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense,
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1088 (2007) (“Stories provide useful structures: plot,
characters, time frames, motives, and settings, which help jurors process and
understand what is otherwise complex and sometimes unfamiliar information.”).
110. Haney, supra note 60, at 876; see also Burt, supra note 14, at 880
(“[D]efense attorneys cannot engage in fiction or . . . invent a character out of whole
cloth to suppress the ‘real’ image of their client, already convicted of a heinous
crime.”) (quoting Cary Federman, Book Review, 42 NO. 6 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 6
(2006) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
111. Eric M. Freedman, Introduction: Re-Stating the Standard of Practice for
Death Penalty Counsel: The Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function
of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 663, 669 (2008).
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Scharlette Holdman, the process of transforming voluminous
mitigation evidence into a structured and persuasive narrative is “‘a
very specialized, complex undertaking.’” 112 Holdman says, “‘That
narrative is not there for the asking . . . . It requires not just knowledge
and skill but experience in how you search for, identify, locate,
recognize, and preserve the information.’” 113
A convincing narrative paints a holistic portrait of the defendant
rather than “simply present[ing] a catalog of seemingly unrelated
mitigating factors.” 114 Likewise, it must transcend a blow-by-blow
chronicling of the defendant’s traumatic history. 115 The narrative
should reflect both the defendant’s suffering and his “admirable
attempts to overcome the obstacles that have been placed before
[him].” 116 Detailed illustrations of specific impactful moments of the
defendant’s life help to highlight his uniqueness and humanity. 117 In
providing a multi-dimensional view of the defendant, the narrative
offers the jury a viable alternative to the prosecution’s portrayal of the
defendant as “pure evil.” 118
In similar fashion, the narrative must extend beyond a third person
account of the events that impacted the defendant and integrate the
perspectives of those who observed or shared in his life
experiences. 119 Doing so lends credibility and immediacy to the
narrative and, more critically, compels the audience to bear witness to
the defendant’s struggles. 120 Further, the narrative should provide a

112. Jeffrey Toobin, The Mitigator: A New Way of Looking at the Death
YORKER,
May
9,
2011,
Penalty,
NEW
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/09/110509fa_fact_toobin.
113. Id.
114. O’Brien, supra note 22, at 835 (quoting ABA Guidelines in Death Penalty
Cases, supra note 30, at 1061) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Haney, supra note 60, at 880 (“An authentic life narrative includes all
facets of the defendant’s life story, including . . . . evidence [of his] admirable
qualities.”).
116. Id.
117. Burt, supra note 14, at 884 (discussing the use of detail to “draw the
reader into the client’s life and community.”).
118. Craig Haney, On Mitigation as Counter-Narrative: A Case Study of the
Hidden Context of Prison Violence, 77 UMKC L. REV. 911, 919 (2009).
119. Dudley & Leonard, supra note 67, at 976.
120. Id.
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broad backdrop for past behavior and actions by illustrating how
“forces the defendant did not choose and over which he had little or
no control” influenced his life. 121 The narrative, then, must juxtapose
those outside “forces” against the defendant’s past success or potential
to thrive under less dire circumstances. 122
At best, mitigation narratives reveal the “unknown story” of the
defendant through the thoughtful reconstruction of the events,
circumstances, and conditions that colored his life. 123 In so doing, the
narrative compels its audience to measure the defendant’s life in
totality rather than by the single act for which he was convicted. 124
When this happens, the work of the mitigation specialist enlivens
Justice Brennan’s words in Furman by safeguarding the dignity of the
capital defendant, regardless of the outcome in the case. 125
Capital Mitigation Investigation and Non-Capital Cases: “Slow but
Steady Advances”
In a 2008 article, Craig Haney, a University of California
psychology professor and expert on the psychological effects of
incarceration, described “slow but steady advances” in the “Supreme
Court’s understanding” of “how central mitigation is to a
constitutional system of death sentencing.” 126 This “progression,”
Haney posited, was most fully realized in Wiggins v. Smith and
121. Haney, supra note 60, at 881.
122. Id. at 880-81.
123. Russell Stetler, The Unknown Story of a Motherless Child, 77 UMKC L.
REV. 947, 951-62 (2009) (detailing the creation of the “unknown story” of the
defendant’s tumultuous life and mental illness after re-investigation into his
background).
124. Haney, supra note 60, at 880 (explaining that the narrative must
“accurately depict[]” the defendant “as someone whose value and worth extends
beyond the worst things he has done.”); see also O’Brien, supra note 22, at 831
(noting that “life-saving [mitigation] narratives” have the potential to “evoke” in
jurors a blend of compassion, “mercy,” and “understanding sufficient to spare” the
convicted from execution.).
125. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. Haney, supra note 60, at 836-37; see also O’Brien, supra note 22, at 837
(“A co-author of the Stanford Prison Experiment, Dr. Haney has long been
concerned about the dehumanizing effects of capital punishment and incarceration
on both inmates and correctional officers.”).
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Rompilla v. Beard. 127 In both cases, the Court determined that
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failure to properly
investigate or present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase
of capital proceedings. 128 Haney noted that, in Wiggins, the Court
“finally acknowledged–in a clear and definitive way–the importance
of developing and, when appropriate, presenting a mitigating social
history.” 129 Haney further noted that, in Rompilla, the Court took a
further step, opining that some mitigation investigation is an
insufficient substitute for a “comprehensive and vigorous” one.130
Writing for the Court, Justice Souter acknowledged that Rompilla’s
defense counsel conducted a partial mitigation investigation but stated
that “undiscovered mitigating evidence” about Rompilla’s history of
poverty and abuse “taken [with other evidence], might well have
influenced the jury’s appraisal of [his] culpability.” 131
Since Haney’s article, the Supreme Court has continued to
confirm the need for mitigating evidence at sentencing.132
Interestingly, its most recent, and perhaps strongest affirmation, came
in two non-capital cases, Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs. 133
In these companion consolidated cases, the Court highlighted the
importance of an in-depth presentation of the offender’s background
and the circumstances of his offense in mitigation of his sentence. 134
Both Miller and Jackson involved 14-year-old boys who were
sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for first-degree
murder. 135

127. Haney, supra note 60, at 851-55 (discussing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard 545 U.S. 374 (2005)).
128. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383.
129. Haney, supra note 60, at 851.
130. Id. at 853.
131. Id. at 855 (quoting Rompilla, 544 U.S. at 393) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
132. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollom, 558 U.S. 30, 30-31, 40 (2009) (per curiam)
(holding that defense counsel’s failure to “uncover and present” mitigating evidence
regarding defendant’s mental health, family background, or military history
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
133. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
134. Id. at 2467-68.
135. Id. at 2460.
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Kuntrell Jackson was charged with felony murder and aggravated
robbery in Arkansas after participating in the hold-up of a video store
during which one of his cohorts shot and killed the store clerk.136
Following his trial conviction, the court imposed a statutorily
mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. 137 Evan Miller and a friend ended a night of drinking and drug
use in Alabama by beating a neighbor and setting fire to his trailer. 138
The neighbor died and Miller was tried as an adult for murder in the
course of arson. 139 He was convicted after a trial and, like Jackson,
received a mandatory life-without-parole sentence. 140
Both
defendants challenged their sentences in state proceedings, arguing
that a life sentence imposed upon a juvenile violates the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 141 Neither
prevailed and the Supreme Court granted the ensuing petitions for
certiorari. 142
The Court struck down both sentences as unconstitutional.143 In
so doing, the majority began from the premise that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against “excessive sanctions” stems “from the
basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to both the offender and offense.” 144 Notably, the
majority then applied and extended the logic of two prior cases
involving juveniles: Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida. 145
“Roper held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for
children,” 146 and Graham “likened life without parole for juveniles to
the death penalty” and rejected such sentences for non-homicide
136. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2462.
139. Id. at 2462-63.
140. Id. at 2463.
141. Id. at 2461, 2463 (Jackson did not appeal his sentence but later filed a
state petition for habeas corpus relief; Miller appealed his sentence.).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2469.
144. Id. at 2463 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id. at 2463-68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71; Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010)).
146. Id. at 2463 (discussing Roper, 543 U.S. at 578).
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offenses. 147 In step with Roper and Graham, the Miller court opined
that a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile convicted
of homicide is disproportionately severe given the “class of
offender[].” 148
Importantly, the Miller majority also relied on Woodson—the
North Carolina case in which the Court barred statutorily mandated
death sentences—in support of its favorable position towards
individualized sentences for juveniles. 149 The Miller Court stressed
that mandatory life sentences for juveniles foreclose essential
sentencing considerations such as: (1) the offender’s “family and
home environment;” (2) “the way familial and peer pressures may
have affected [the offender]”; (3) “the circumstances of the . . .
offense, including the extent of [the offender’s] participation”; and (4)
“the possibility of rehabilitation.” 150
Turning to the specific case facts, the Court observed that
Jackson’s “age could well have affected his calculation of the risk that
[the shotgun] posed” and cited his “background and immersion in
violence,” including his family history of gun-related violence. 151
Miller’s case also included substantial mitigating factors, beginning
with an early childhood pockmarked by physical abuse, followed by at
least four suicide attempts, which culminated with heavy drug and
alcohol use on the night of the incident. 152 While the Court readily
acknowledged that both defendants deserved “severe punishment,” “a
sentencer needed to examine all [possible mitigating factors] before
concluding that life without any possibility of parole was the
appropriate penalty.” 153
While the Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy concerns the sentencing
of juveniles, two aspects of the cases suggest a continued shift
demonstrating how central mitigation is to all sentencing. First, the
line of cases originated with Roper, a capital case, before the Court
147. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (discussing Graham,
560 U.S. at 81-82).
148. Id. at 2471-73.
149. Id. at 2467 (discussing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976)).
150. Id. at 2468.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2469.
153. Id.
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extended the same principles applied in capital cases to non-capital
cases. 154 Second, the ruling of unconstitutionality rested on the
proportionality of sentencing as measured against a range of
mitigating factors. 155 The Court in Miller cited Woodson, a capital
case, as instructive about the value of individualized sentencing in
non-death cases. 156 Specifically, the Court reiterated that the critical
flaw in Woodson’s mandatory capital sentencing mechanism was its
failure to give “significance to ‘the character and record of the
individual offender or the circumstances’ of the offense, and [its]
‘exclud[ing] from consideration . . . the possibility of compassionate
or mitigating factors.’” 157 Again, while Woodson contemplated a
death statute, the Court’s extension of similar concerns to a noncapital sentence is striking.
PART II
THE ROLE OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION IN IMPROVING MITIGATION
INVESTIGATION AND PRESENTATION
Miller’s bridging of the two historically “different” worlds of
capital and non-capital jurisprudence highlights the critical value of
mitigation evidence in all cases, as well as the obligation of defense
counsel to dig deeply into the client’s past. 158 Despite the clear
mandate from the Supreme Court and the ABA, many criminal

154. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466-67 (2012). Indeed, the Miller
Court observed that its decision in Graham was “unprecedented” for its treatment of
a term of life imprisonment as “akin to the death penalty.” Id.
155. Id. at 2464-66. Mitigating factors include “lack of maturity” and
“vulnerab[ility]” to “negative influences,” developmental issues such as the
“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” and the comparatively
favorable “prospects for reform” between children and adults. Id. (quoting Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 2467.
157. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
158. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of
death is different in kind from any other punishment . . . .”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (noting that the death penalty is “qualitatively different from
any other sentence” (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002) (reiterating that there is “no
doubt that ‘[d]eath is different’” (alteration in original) (quoting counsel)).
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defense lawyers—especially those in the non-capital world—still
possess a limited view of mitigation. 159 As mitigation specialist Jesse
Cheng explains, “Lawyers are not trained in the communication or
listening skills needed [for mitigation investigation. To the contrary,]
lawyers are trained to find the right facts to fit the right doctrinal
boxes or principles of case law in order to advance their arguments.
But mitigation is a considerably more expansive practice.” 160
A 2007 Carnegie Foundation-funded study on legal education
(hereinafter “the Carnegie Report”) supports Cheng’s critique. 161
Drawing on cognitive science, the study’s authors posit that law
schools are very good at teaching “‘analytic’ or ‘paradigmatic’”
thinking. 162 Analytic thinking, the process associated with the
traditional casebook lecture, “detaches things and events from the
situations of everyday life and represents them in more abstract and
Skills such as “ranking and ordering,”
systematic ways.” 163
“[e]stablishing
cause-and-effect,”
and
identifying
“logical
164
relationships” fall within this category.
While the development of
these skills is essential for law students, the practice of law also
depends on expertise in “narrative modes of thinking.” 165 Narrative
thinking, in contrast to analytic, is premised on the theory that “things
and events acquire significance by being placed within a story, an
ongoing context of meaningful interaction.” 166 The study emphasizes
that effective legal practice requires “fluency” in both narrative
thinking and analytic thinking. 167
As the Carnegie Report recommends, clinical legal education
offers one avenue for students to receive training in the practiceoriented skills associated with narrative thinking. 168
Clinical
159. E-mail from Jesse Cheng, Capital Mitigation Specialist, to author (Jan. 5,
2013, 11:05 p.m. EST) (on file with author).
160. Id.
161. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 96-97.
162. Id. (quoting JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS
(1985)).
163. Id. at 96.
164. Id. at 96-97.
165. Id. at 97.
166. Id. at 96.
167. Id. at 97.
168. Id. at 96-97, 195.
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programs, say the study’s authors, comprise an important part of
“integrative strategy” to complement the historically theory-focused
approach of law schools. 169 A look at the origins and development of
law school legal clinics lends insight into how contemporary clinical
education helps shape “the analytical and practical habits of mind that
professional practice demands.” 170
A Brief History of Law School Clinics
In 1933, John Bradway, the director of the Legal Aid Clinic at the
Duke University School of Law, proposed in a landmark article to
“bridge[] the gap between the theory of law school and the practice of
the profession” by integrating clinics into the traditional
curriculum. 171 Bradway argued that clinical education teaches
students to apply substantive and procedural law from coursework “in
the solution of actual unsolved human problems” 172 and analyze legal
questions from their beginnings rather than as “a completed case
embalmed on a printed page.” 173 In tandem with “instruction by
lectures and textbooks,” 174 Bradway championed the role of clinics in
developing “well rounded student[s]” 175 who demonstrate
“proficiency, dependability, social viewpoint, and the other
characteristics of a good lawyer in active practice.” 176 Bluntly, he
warned: “The student suffers if he does not have clinical [legal]
training.” 177
While the concept of clinical legal education originated in the
early twentieth century, Bradway’s indictment of “law in books”

169. Id. at 191, 195-96.
170. Id. at 97 (“How to blend the analytical and practical habits of mind that
professional practice demands is, we believe, the most complex and interesting
pedagogical challenge in the preparation of legal practitioners.”).
171. John S. Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic
Course, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 (1933).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 471.
174. Id. at 472.
175. Id. at 477.
176. Id. at 478-79.
177. Id. at 477.
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provided a clarion call for advocates of “learn[ing] by doing.” 178 He
was joined by other critics of “needlessly abstract” law school
curricula. 179 In a 1933 article, Judge Jerome Frank compared law
students without practical training to “prospective dog breeders who
never see anything but stuffed dogs.” 180 Soon thereafter, Columbia
professor Karl Llewellyn argued that law schools should withhold a
student’s degree until the successful completion of a post-graduate
apprenticeship. 181 Without the introduction of meaningful and
innovative methods to train students, Llewellyn predicted that law
school education would remain “inadequate, wasteful, blind and
foul.” 182 His colorful admonition notwithstanding, theory-centered
courses remained the bulwark of legal education for the next several
decades. 183
The modern law school clinic began to take shape in the late
1960s amidst changing views about the role and function of the legal
profession. 184 In the wake of new federal anti-poverty initiatives and
the robust civil rights movement, broad coalitions of lawyers
embraced a philosophy that the law could act as an instrument for
positive social change. 185 Further, the 1963 Supreme Court decision
in Gideon v. Wainwright, requiring counsel for indigent criminal

178. Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of
Clinical Education, 64 TENN. L. REV. 939, 945 (1997) (quoting JOHN S. BRADWAY,
BASIC LEGAL AID CLINIC MATERIALS AND EXERCISES ON TAKING HOLD OF A CASE
AT LAW 6 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 675 (1935).
180. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
907, 912 (1933).
181. Llewellyn, supra note 179, at 675-76.
182. Id. at 677-78 (“We put out course-books, which make one man’s
experience in part available to many other men. But as to method of teaching–there
we balk at communication, we balk at analysis. This is idiocy, plain and drooling.”).
183. See Blaze, supra note 178, at 941 (describing the growth in clinical legal
education movement beyond the 1950s).
184. Norman Fell, Development of a Criminal Law Clinic: A Blended
Approach, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 275, 277 (1996).
185. Alan W. Houseman, Legal Aid History, in POVERTY LAW MANUAL FOR
THE NEW LAWYER 18, 19-20 (2002), available at http://web.jhu.edu/prepro/law/PreLaw.Forms.WordDocs/Public.Interest.Law.1.pdf.
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defendants charged with felonies, 186 created a demand for competent
defense attorneys. 187 Buoyed by grants from the Council on Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility (“CLEPR”), a non-profit
organization established by the Ford Foundation, a wave of law school
clinics emerged to provide free legal assistance to low-income
communities, help fulfill Gideon’s mandate, and promote equal access
to the justice system. 188 Over the life of CLEPR funding, nearly half
of the law schools in the country created clinical programs. 189
The rapid rise of clinics, aside from their place within the social
justice trends of the era, was hastened by evolving views about the
pedagogical value of practical training for law students. 190 The
growth of reform-minded legal activism brought with it a new regard
for experiential learning designed to prepare law students for direct
client representation. 191 To be sure, skills-based curricula were still
widely regarded as progressive and, in most cases, inferior to the
traditional “case-dialogue” model. 192 Nonetheless, legal clinics
offered an ideal setting for a growing number of students interested in
putting casebook lectures into practice while responding to a larger
moral and social calling. 193
186. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
187. See Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51
SMU L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1998) (discussing the growth of legal clinics to serve
social justice considerations, particularly to provide “free legal services to indigent
clients.”).
188. Id. at 1464-66. At the same time, the value of law students representing
indigent client was not lost on the Supreme Court. In his concurring opinion in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972), Justice Brennan observed that “law
students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and
qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases
reached by [our] decision [requiring that criminal defendants facing possible
incarceration must be represented by counsel].”
189. Mary Berkheiser, Frasier Meets Clea: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Law School Clinics, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1147, 1153 (1999).
190. Fell, supra note 184, at 278.
191. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 92.
192. Id. at 92-93 (“[Traditional] [c]urricula did not change much, but some
law schools began to experiment with teaching the rules of professional
responsibility within practice settings . . . .”).
193. Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of Clinical Legal
Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 509, 513
(2003); Dubin, supra note 187 at 1466.
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Over the last four decades, clinical legal education has slowly
developed into “an integral component of law school instruction.”194
Though at times halting, the growth of clinics has been spurred by
continued critiques that law schools prize doctrine over skills
development. 195 In 1992, the ABA released the MacCrate Report,
encouraging law schools to address the disparity between legal
education and the actual practice of law through the development of
clinical programs. 196 More recently, the authors of the Carnegie
Report concluded that law schools have unmet duty to equip students
with “the reflective capacity and motivation to pursue genuine
expertise.” 197 To better shape competent practitioners, the study’s
recommendations include that third-year law students “engage in
advanced clinical training.” 198 The MacCrate and Carnegie Reports
have proved instrumental in boosting the presence of legal clinics and
reaffirming their critical role within law schools. 199
The Law School Criminal Defense Clinic: A Basic Structure
As Bradway envisioned, contemporary law school clinics provide
students with opportunities to work with clients, collaborate with
practicing attorneys, craft case strategies, and participate in court

194. Valdez Carey, supra note 193, at 509.
195. Dubin, supra note 187, at 1468.
196. AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 5 (1992), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/201
3_legal_education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).authcheckdam.
pdf.
197. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 173.
198. Id. at 195.
199. Dubin, supra note 187, at 1469 (“From 1992 to 1998, the number of law
school faculty teaching in clinical courses has increased from approximately 850 to
1150.”); see also ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION viii
(2007), available at http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best_practicesfull.pdf (“The central message in both Best Practices and in the contemporaneous
Carnegie report is that law schools should . . . broaden the range of lessons they
teach, reducing doctrinal instruction that uses the Socratic dialogue and the case
method . . . .”).
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hearings. 200 Through clinical education, students acquire a spectrum
of essential lawyering skills and receive a first chance to apply
procedural and substantive law in a “real life” context.201
Additionally, students develop professional responsibility by learning
to balance the day-to-day demands of a case, resolve ethical
quandaries, and effectively communicate with the bar and bench. 202
Moreover, in the spirit of their 1960s predecessors, many current law
school clinics serve the public interest through representation of lowincome clients who would otherwise be unable to afford competent
counsel. 203
Criminal defense clinics exemplify a model designed to combine
the experiential learning ideals upon which clinical legal education
was founded with the essential access to justice concerns brought to
the forefront by Gideon. 204 Structurally speaking, most criminal
defense clinics resemble small law firms housed within the law
school. 205 A clinic director—or, in some cases, two co-directors—
200. Ann Marie Cavazos, The Journey Toward Excellence in Clinical Legal
Education: Developing, Utilizing and Evaluating Methodologies for Determining
and Assessing the Effectiveness of Student Learning Outcomes, 40 SW. L. REV. 1, 7
(2010).
201. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New
Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 47173 (1995); see also PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER, REFLECTIONS ON
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 250 (1998) (“Exploring ethical dilemmas before they
are resolved, and while students and teachers must make agonizing decisions and
then live with the consequences, makes . . . clinic work lively.”).
202. Blaze, supra note 178, at 949 (“The difference between [skills and
professional responsibility—as defined by University of Tennessee Legal Clinic
founder Charles H. Miller—]‘is roughly comparable to the difference between the
carpenter’s ability to hammer a nail . . . and, on the other hand, the architect’s
capacity to design and supervise the construction of a building which is suitable to
the needs of his client.’” (quoting CHARLES H. MILLER, LIVING PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: CLINICAL APPROACH 5 (1973) (unpublished manuscript)).
203. Valdez Carey, supra note 193, at 517-18.
204. Id. at 519 (“Cases litigated in service-oriented or law-reform clinics can
be used in reaching educational goals for law students as well as achieving positive
outcomes for clients or instigating societal or legal reform.”).
205. The structural model I discuss is reflective of a typical “in-house”
criminal defense clinic, but other models exist. For more about the “in-house”
model, see Robert R. Rigg, Teaching Gideon — The Development and Challenges of
a Criminal Defense Program, 7 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 111, 118-19
(2004); Fell, supra note 184, at 284-85; and SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 201,
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supervises a small group of student-attorneys. 206 The studentattorneys are awarded temporary licenses to practice law. 207
Typically, the clinic receives cases through collaboration with the
public defender or via direct appointment by the court. 208 Cases are
chosen based on the nature of the crime charged, the prospect of a trial
or other contested motions, and the likelihood of resolution within a
semester or academic year. 209 In most states, the client must provide
written consent to student representation. 210
Clinic caseloads are manageable, at least in comparison to the
avalanche of cases routinely handled by court-appointed defense
counsel. 211 Generally, teams of two or three student-attorneys are
assigned to one case. 212 Students share and divide responsibilities,
functioning as client counselors, case investigators, and courtroom
advocates. 213 Ideally, the same students participate in a single case
from the initial client meeting through the case’s conclusion. 214

at 252 (discussing the value of clinics with “at least two instructors, because clinical
teaching involves so many novel teaching problems, and is so stressful, that a
clinical teacher needs at least one colleague with whom to share problems on
virtually a daily basis.”).
206. Fell, supra note 184, at 285 (“The average ratio is eight to ten students to
one faculty member.”).
207. Cavazos, supra note 200, at 12; Valdez Carey, supra note 193, at 516
(“Today, every state and most federal courts have rules that allow law students who
are enrolled in clinics to represent clients in court under the direct supervision of a
law school faculty member or a licensed attorney.”).
208. Rigg, supra note 205, at 115 (discussing the challenges of receiving
clients through the county public defender’s office versus direct appointment of
cases by the court).
209. Id. at 121-22.
210. Quigley, supra note 201, at 492.
211. Rigg, supra note 205, at 111-19 (“The class size is limited to four
student-attorneys and each are assigned normally to no more than ten clients
[charged with misdemeanors].”); see also SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 201 at
247 (“At CALS, we have always chosen to make the students’ case load very low so
that they could examine with great care every one of their decisions and actions.”).
212. SCHRAG & MELTSNER. supra note 201, at 248 (“The reason for . . .
collaboration [in clinics] is that joint effort usually produces better results . . . than
individual work.”).
213. Cavazos, supra note 200, at 28-29; Quigley, supra note 201 at 484-85.
214. According to Lynda Johnston at Stanford Law School:
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Through involvement from start to finish, students learn to forge
lasting client relationships, establish short- and long-term case
objectives, and manage various court-imposed deadlines. 215
Typically, the clinic director functions as an advisor, assisting
students in developing a theory of the case, determining the
appropriate motions to file, and navigating the court system. 216 More
broadly, the director helps students clarify the overarching goals of
representation based upon the nature of the case, the desires and
expectations of the client, and the probable outcome. 217 When
unexpected obstacles invariably arise, the director encourages students
to “figure out a creative alternative . . . and . . . find the courage to
deviate from the accepted norm of practice.” 218 At a minimum, the
director seeks to give the student-attorney an opportunity to play an
impactful role in the case while ensuring that the client receives
effective assistance of counsel throughout. 219

The Stanford Law School Criminal Defense Clinic receives its cases
exclusively on referral from the Santa Clara County Public Defender’s Office
and the San Mateo County Bar Association’s Private Defender
Program. With respect to selection criteria, our students represent only
misdemeanor defendants. [The clinic director] chooses cases for the
pedagogical opportunities they present for our students. In my observation,
all the cases allow the students to take mastery (under very intensive instructor
supervision) over the entire trajectory of a case, from pretrial conference
through settlement, dismissal, or jury trial, and, if appropriate, through appeal.
E-mail from Lynda Johnston, Legal Assistant, Stanford Law School, to author (Aug.
5, 2013, 2:05 p.m. EST) (on file with author).
215. Id.
216. See Cavazos, supra note 200, at 30-31 (discussing the ideal
communication between the supervisor and student-attorney).
217. See SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra note 201, at 242-52 (discussing the
goals of clinical education programs and how their various structures can achieve
those goals).
218. Id. at 250-51; see also Quigley, supra note 201 at 486 (discussing a
system in which the director acts as lead counsel at the outset of the case but
gradually cedes control as the “confiden[ce] and competen[ce]” of students
increase.).
219. Quigley, supra note 201 at 485; Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag,
Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1978) (“The tension between our
roles as facilitators of intern-oriented learning and as supervisors on cases affecting
actual clients’ interests is a constant, major theme in our work.”).
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In addition to case management, supervisors must consider the
student-attorney’s professional development. 220 Often, clinic directors
require students to maintain and periodically submit a journal
reflecting on their work. 221 Using the journal entries as a springboard
for follow-up discussion, the director meets with students individually
to offer guidance, support, or suggestions for problem-solving. 222
Additionally, most clinics include a “classroom component” in which
students formulate litigation tactics, bolster trial skills, and discuss
challenges with cases or clients. 223 In class, the clinic director
provides “feedback,” constructive “critiques,” and additional
opportunities for “reflection.” 224 In contrast to a typical law school
course in which the sole evaluative opportunity is a final exam, these
ongoing assessments foster a collaborative environment in which the
director and student work together to enhance the quality of client
representation and the overall clinical experience. 225
PART III
CAPITAL MITIGATION INVESTIGATION IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL
DEFENSE CLINICS: DEVELOPING A “THEORY FOR PRACTICE”
The process of representing “real clients” in the clinical setting
“[p]otentially . . . encompasses everything about being a lawyer.” 226
In light of the “almost infinite” number of “opportunities for [clinical]
teaching and learning” in the process of “client representation,” a
220. For a fascinating discussion of the challenges and rewards of student
supervision in law school clinics, see Michael Meltsner, James V. Rowan & Daniel
J. Givelber, The Bike Tour Leader’s Dilemma: Talking About Supervision, 13 VT. L.
REV. 399 (1989).
221. J.P. Ogilvy, The Use of Journals in Legal Education: A Tool for
Reflection, 3 CLIN. L. REV. 55, 75 (1996).
222. Id.
223. See STUCKEY, supra note 199, at 145 (requiring as a “best practice” of inhouse clinics the inclusion of “classroom components that help accomplish the
educational goals of the course.”); see also Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic,
3 CLIN. L. REV. 175, 236-37 (1996); Rigg, supra note 205, at 117.
224. Cavazos, supra note 200, at 9-10.
225. Id.
226. See STUCKEY, supra note 199, at 139 (“It is impossible to describe fully
what a student might learn by participating as a lawyer in the representation of real
clients.”).
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“clear understanding[]” of “educational goals” is vital. 227 Of equal
importance is the development of effective strategies or models to
pursue these goals–or what the Carnegie Report authors might call a
“theory for practice.” 228 A “theory for practice,” according to the
study, is “a kind of toolkit of well-founded procedures within clearly
delineated areas of professional work.” 229 On one hand, a “theory for
practice” can serve as the conceptual framework within which to
articulate, enliven, and replicate clinical goals from one case or
semester to the next. 230 In addition, a “theory for practice” can
“provide scaffolding” to “aid [student-attorneys] in navigating the
complexities and uncertainties of developing case theory.” 231
The techniques of capital mitigation investigation can provide a
“theory for practice” to achieve several pedagogical goals of noncapital criminal defense clinics, especially as they relate to sentencing
advocacy. In addition, an investigative protocol can function as a
framework—or “scaffolding”—to help student-attorneys compile,
analyze, and present mitigation evidence. Moreover, in light of the
time-consuming and complex nature of mitigation investigation,
creation of a standard clinical protocol can facilitate similar
investigation for recent graduates who face oppressive caseloads and
limited resources as public defenders. 232
227. Id.
228. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 100-01.
229. Id. at 101-03 (Stated another way, “[i]n the realm of teaching expert
practice, theories are really statements of technique in the classic sense of welltested procedures for achieving specific outcomes in certain kinds of situations.”).
230. Id. (“Just as the case-dialogue method at its best can represent in a public
way the processes of reasoning embedded in complex legal opinions, it is likewise
possible to articulate the conceptual models involved in the important skills that
define effective lawyering: in developing evidence, interviewing, counseling,
drafting documents, conducting research, and negotiating.”).
231. Id. at 103. A theory for practice can also help clinical students define,
clarify, and reflect upon “key values” of the legal profession, some of which are not
always readily definable—e.g., “the importance of seeking justice and providing
access to justice.” See STUCKEY, supra note 199, at 140.
232. As Professor Phyllis Goldfarb writes in reference to the “theory for
practice,” “[b]oth the Carnegie Hall-bound musician and the Carnegie Report-bred
lawyer undergo a theoretically grounded developmental process of enacting
underlying principles in performance, and only then do the principles acquire
meaning, value, and life.” Phyllis Goldfarb, Back to the Future of Clinical Legal
Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 279, 290 (2012).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

33

California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 1, Art. 3
Mundy Final Edit.docx (Do Not Delete)

64

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

3/24/2014 10:18 AM

[Vol. 50

Capital Mitigation Investigation and Clinical Goals: 233
Learning Lawyering Skills
Implementing a basic capital mitigation investigative model helps
student-attorneys develop traditional lawyering skills such as
investigating facts, acquiring records, interviewing witnesses,
counseling clients, and writing persuasively. 234 For example, through
creation of a records collection protocol, student-attorneys learn the
essential steps to obtain educational, medical, or governmental records
and the process of analyzing those documents. 235 Invariably, the
records-acquisition process also includes unwanted lessons about
bureaucratic entanglements that delay the receipt of documents and
the importance of early requests for release. More subtly, in the
pursuit of records, student-attorneys gain an important lesson in the
trust-building that precedes a request for a client’s signature to release
sensitive records.
Similarly, the process of conducting intensive interviews with the
client and select others is critical training for the student-attorney. As
one clinical text describes, client interviewing combines the
“intellectual challenge” of assessing the client’s legal problem with
the “emotional challenge” of establishing a working relationship with
a person who is often under considerable stress. 236 Mitigation-focused
interviews magnify these challenges in several ways. First, due to the
233. The educational goals I discuss are shared by most “live client” law
school clinics, not just non-capital criminal defense clinics. In addition, the goals
are representative, not exhaustive. The sources from which the goals are drawn
include Schrag, supra note 223, at 245-47; STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K.
NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS, (4th ed. 2011); Susan Bryant, The
Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 33
(2001), and my own experience as a clinician.
234. See Schrag, supra note 223, at 185, 187.
235. As an ancillary point, the release process also helps the student become
familiar with the releases required for specific records. In some cases, records may
be acquired with a boilerplate release. In others, however, a unique form is required.
For instance, most hospitals and other medical facilities require a release tailored to
the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA). In the same vein, refusal to release documents by a medical facility,
prison, educational institution, or other body will, in many cases, provide the
student-attorney an opportunity to secure and serve a subpoena duces tecum for the
sought-after records.
236. KRIEGER & NEUMANN , supra note 233, at 88.
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sensitivity of the topics explored during mitigation interviews, the
student-attorney must become especially adept at identifying and
addressing inhibitors that obstruct the client’s candor. 237 Further, in
mitigation, the student-attorney must listen actively and
empathetically to the client, a difficult skill to master. 238 Moreover,
the student-attorney’s use of a “client-centered” approach to
representation, while vital to the mitigation interview, is uniquely
challenging in this context. 239 Client-centered lawyering “treat[s] the
client as an effective collaborator (rather than as “a helpless person [in
need of] rescue).” 240 Often, though, mitigation interviews turn up
information that paints the client in a desperate light. To encourage
the client’s disclosure of trauma, abject poverty, or addiction while
simultaneously endorsing his role as an empowered and capable case
collaborator requires a delicate touch. Among other benefits,
however, the client-centered approach “promotes the dignity of
clients” in the midst of painful admissions and facilitates a personal
relationship that often results in more productive dialogue. 241
Discovering Social Justice
The records collection and interview process offer noteworthy
examples of the way mitigation investigation often leads the studentattorney to a fuller understanding of law and social justice. 242 As
Professor Phyllis Goldfarb writes, “[t]eaching lawyering in the context
of assisting individuals and communities subordinated by social
structures . . . opens dimensions for learning.” 243 These “dimensions”
include a “greater awareness” of the professional obligation to
237. Id. at 91 (possible client “inhibitors” include embarrassment about
divulging a legal problem, inability to remember events, and “cultural, social, age,
or dialect barriers”).
238. Id. at 92.
239. Id. at 22 (quoting DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN M. PRICE, LEGAL
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977)).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 23 (quoting DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:
WHO’S IN CHARGE? 168 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Goldfarb, supra note 232, at 302-03; see also Dubin, supra note 187, at
1477-78.
243. Goldfarb, supra note 232, at 304.
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promote “fairness, equality under the law, and equal access to justice”
and an “understanding of what subordination means in people’s lives
and how it operates on a regular basis.” 244
Teaching lawyering, as it relates to mitigation-intensive
sentencing advocacy, is an especially effective method to instill social
justice values in students. By studying the client’s life experiences indepth, the student-attorney gains a sense of the “relationship between
law and issues of social justice at both broad[-]based and personal
levels.” 245 Broadly, the student-attorney develops insight into ways in
which an ostensibly fair, just, and impartial legal process often
disproportionately penalizes marginalized communities. 246 More
personally, the realization of such disparity often causes the studentattorney to question previous notions of “how the world works” and
leads to a changed societal perspective. 247 The development of a
social justice-influenced perspective has both immediate and lasting
benefits. In the short term, the student-attorney, through a deeper
understanding of the client, will likely become a more zealous
advocate for the client’s interests. Over the long run, the impactful
experience of representation will inform the student-attorney’s
professional choices with respect to public or pro bono service.
Developing Cross-Cultural Awareness
In similar fashion, mitigation investigation serves to build a core
clinical teaching objective: cross-cultural awareness. 248 Cross-cultural
awareness, as the term implies, occurs when law students “learn by

244. Id. at 302-04.
245. Dubin, supra note 187, at 1477 (quoting Fran Quigley, Seizing the
Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in
Law School Clinics, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 37, 43 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
246. See id. at 1477-78 (positing that “many law students come to [law
school]” without “significant exposure” to the “victims of injustice” and have
limited experience dealing with an “unresponsive legal system”) (quoting Quigley,
supra note 245, at 52-53) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. Id. (quoting Quigley, supra note 245, at 51) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
248. For a detailed and fascinating discussion on teaching diversity issues in
clinics, see generally Bryant, supra note 233.
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interacting closely with people from other cultures.” 249 “When
lawyers and clients come from different cultures,” writes Professor
Susan Bryant, “several aspects” of representation are “implicated,”
including the “capacity to form trusting relationships, . . to develop
client-centered case strategies and solutions, [and] to gather
information.” 250 Bryant emphasizes that “non-judgmental thinking” is
central to developing cross-cultural awareness. 251 Such thinking, she
writes, encompasses the ability to “enter into the cultural imagination
of another” and reframe as “‘normal things that at first seem bizarre or
strange.’” 252
Mitigation investigation encourages this synergistic thought
process. As previously discussed, the capital mitigation specialist
must view evidence from the perspective of the client’s cultural
background, and dismantle false assumptions about race, ethnicity, or
religion to contextualize experiences with which the jury may be
unfamiliar. If, for example, student-attorneys make “assumptions and
judgments” about the client that “grow out of [their] own cultural
blinders,” an intensive exploration into the client’s background often
In much the same way,
generates positive self-reflection. 253
mitigation investigation helps “expose [student-attorneys] to the
limitations of relying on their own experiences to interpret client
behavior.” 254 In other words, rather than resting on first impressions,
an in-depth investigation exalts “the importance of searching for
alternative explanations” for the client’s actions. 255 Finally, as Bryant
stresses, cross-cultural awareness requires the development of “deep
listening skills.” 256 Much like active listening, “deep listening”
249. Schrag, supra note 223, at 182.
250. Bryant, supra note 233 at 41-42.
251. Id. at 56.
252. Id. (quoting RAYMONDE CARROLL, CULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS:
THE FRENCH-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 2 (1988)).
253. Id. at 88. As Bryant describes, “students will begin asking themselves
questions such as: Why I am judging this client negatively? Is it because we have
different values, experiences, or opportunities?” Id.
254. Id. at 93.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 94 (“Most students who were encouraged in their childhood to
pursue a legal career probably received this advice because they displayed a
tendency to argue, not because they were good listeners.”).
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involves patience, empathy, and an ability to recognize “non-verbal
cues” from both sides that may impede the exchange. 257 As “deep
listening skills” are not easily acquired, Bryant encourages studentattorneys to “look for red flags—clues that something is going wrong”
during client interviews. 258 In noting and reflecting on “red flags,”
student-attorneys are apt to discover the source of the
miscommunication and formulate an approach to improve subsequent
interaction. 259 By requiring student-attorneys to work with clients in
depth, detail, and around sensitive subject matter, mitigation
investigation is an ideal forum to practice and cultivate deep listening
skills.
Integrating Facts and Law
Non-capital mitigation investigation also teaches clinical students
to think about the relationship between facts, evidence, and legal
theory. Specifically, unlike the “pure story” of the capital mitigation
narrative, the non-capital narrative must be framed with the applicable
sentencing statutes or guidelines in mind. Thus, the non-capital
student-attorney must consider, for example, how hospital records
reflecting the client’s multiple prescription drug overdoses should be
handled in light of the federal statutory mandate that “the sentence
imposed . . . promote[s] respect for the law” and “provide[s] the
defendant with needed . . . medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.” 260 If the records are utilized,
the student-attorney must then devise an effective strategy to move
them into evidence. Professor Philip Schrag calls this process
“[c]oping with facts.” 261 Schrag notes the tendency in clinics to spend
“far more time discovering facts” and turning “those facts into
admissible evidence” than considering legal theory (in contrast to the
approach in doctrinal courses to “take facts as given and study only
law and policy”). 262 Because “working on cases inevitably requires

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 95.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2010).
Schrag, supra note 223, at 182 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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the appropriate linkages to be made,” Schrag strives to help students
understand the relationship between facts, legal theory, and evidence
in his clinic. 263 By requiring students to link mitigation facts,
sentencing law, and evidentiary concerns, the non-capital presentation
exemplifies the coping process Schrag describes.
Building Creativity and Courage
As Schrag and others suggest, a critical piece of clinical teaching
is instilling in students the confidence and ingenuity to devise creative
solutions for complex legal problems. 264 Clinical students, Schrag
writes, are “startled by how successful they can be by allowing
themselves to be imaginative.” 265 The mitigation narrative demands
both creativity and courage. Faced with a daunting amount of often
conflicting and complicated evidence, the student-attorney must craft
a persuasive and credible presentation. Doing so requires not only
astute analysis of the evidence but also the imagination to reconstruct
the client’s history in the most compelling light. Moreover, the
presentation, by its very nature, deviates from the legal jargon and
case citations that dominate most court pleadings. Rather, the
mitigation narrative, in the words of the Carnegie Report, centers on
the placement of “things and events . . . within a story.” 266 As a result,
the presentation necessitates that the student-attorney have the
conviction to break from the well-traveled path of antiseptic legal
arguments and, instead, tell a story rich in detail, imagery, and
emotion. Fortunately, the impact of the student-attorney’s courage
and creativity as measured in less-punitive, more rehabilitationfocused sentences is, to paraphrase Schrag, often startling.
Improving Advocacy
Most important, the use of a capital mitigation investigation
model forwards a baseline goal of all criminal defense clinics:
providing zealous representation. 267 The mitigation narrative may be
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 184.
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31 at 96, 122-23.
See Rigg, supra note 205, at 112-14.
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utilized during plea negotiations or integrated into pre-sentencing
pleadings in place of boilerplate introductory language and generic
pleas for leniency.
Even in misdemeanor cases, in which
incarceration for one year or less is at stake, a cohesive and moving
mitigation presentation can have a significant impact on the case
outcome. 268
Ellen Shultz, a capital mitigation specialist who has worked in the
Eastern and Northern Districts of Virginia, believes a basic capital
mitigation protocol is “readily transferable” to non-capital cases. 269
For such a model, Shultz recommends creation of “a contact list,
records list, and social history timeline” through initial interviews with
the client and others close to him. 270 The mitigation narrative based
on the resulting evidence can serve to enlighten the court about the
defendant’s “history and characteristics” at sentencing. 271
As the following excerpts from sentencing narratives exemplify, a
mitigation investigation based on a model like the one Shultz
describes can produce powerful results. First, from a review of school
records, a vivid snapshot of the defendant’s turbulent childhood and
the “need for the sentence . . . to provide [him] with needed
educational or vocational training,” is possible: 272
268. For instance, in Illinois, as elsewhere, offenders convicted of a
misdemeanor may be sentenced to up to one year in jail. JUNAID AFEEF ET AL., ILL.
CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTH., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
6
(2005),
available
at
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/researchreports/policies_and_procedures_of_t
he_illinois_criminal_justice_system_aug2012.pdf.
Unlike felony convictions,
however, after which the probability of a custodial sentence is high, a sentencing
court has “several options” in misdemeanor cases. Id. at 25. Examples include a
“diversion program” in which judgment in the case is suspended for “a specific
period of time [and] [i]f the offender complies with all conditions set by the court,
the offender will be released without a conviction.” Id. Another example is drug
probation for first offenders in which successful completion of a substance abuse
treatment program may result in an expunged conviction. Id. at 26. In light of the
alternative sentencing options available in misdemeanor cases, presentation of
mitigating evidence about the defendant’s background and history may be especially
critical.
269. E-mail from Ellen Shultz, Capital Mitigation Specialist, to author (Aug.
8, 2013, 9:24 a.m. EST) (on file with author).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2010).
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Paul was shuffled between homes and schools frequently.
Beginning in first grade, he attended six schools in as many years,
sometimes transferring in the middle of the academic year back to a
school he previously attended. The instability had a detrimental
impact on Paul’s academic and social development. He was held
back in first grade after attending two different schools and moving
three times. He repeated the grade, but remained at the same home
and school for the entire academic year. In a stable environment,
Paul’s performance improved dramatically.
He received a
cumulative grade of A in mathematics, A in spelling, B in language
arts, and C in reading. By contrast, in second grade, Paul lived at
three separate addresses and attended as many schools. He
received grades of D or F in all aforementioned subjects. The
disruptive pattern continued as Paul was moved through different
schools and residences, including two foster homes, over the next
four years. He dropped out of school in the seventh grade. 273

In another narrative, client interviews supported by foster care
records shape an argument about the client’s “lesser role” as a courier
in a drug trafficking enterprise: 274
In the days after her mother’s arrest on drug charges, Sheri’s stepfather returned from Illinois. Unable to locate a relative in
Clarksville to care for Sheri or her two siblings, he took the
children to an impoverished, crime-ridden neighborhood in
Chicago. Once there, Sheri began suffering physical abuse at the
hands of her step-father and his girlfriend. The children were soon
sent to an aunt, who lacked the interest or resources to provide for
them. Social services intervened, and Sheri and her siblings were
split into different homes. Sheri would never live with her brother
or sister again. She was not even nine-years-old. 275

273. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. June 9, 2009) (on file with
author).
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (providing that the court should consider the
“nature and circumstances of the offense” when determining a particular sentence);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a) (2010) (providing that if the
defendant was a “minimal participant” in the offense their offense level may be
reduced by four levels under the Sentencing Guidelines).
275. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2005) (on file with
author).
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In another excerpt, interviews with the client and family members
capture the impact of the client’s early childhood in war-torn El
Salvador to mitigate his unlawful entry into the United States and
subsequent gang involvement:
As the civil war escalated, bloodshed and suffering became a daily
reality for the residents of Albornoz. Located close to a
government military base, the town was a target for revolutionaries.
Seven-year-old Ronald saw bodies in the streets and heard constant
gunfire as he lay in bed at night. Often, school was cancelled
amidst rumors of approaching guerrilla troops. For a time,
Ronald’s family shuffled between their home and the western
village of Arce in an effort to escape the violence. The respite was
always short-lived, though, and the journey often proved more
harrowing than daily life in Albornoz. 276

Finally, records documenting the recent incarceration of a client’s
estranged spouse demonstrate the client’s extraordinary “family ties
and responsibilities” as a single parent: 277
James is a single father. Should he be imprisoned, the family will
be hard-pressed to find an alternate care-giver for the boys.
James’s wife, Melissa, is not a suitable choice. Though Melissa is
the boys’ birth mother, she has been estranged from the family
since 1999. Melissa has been recalcitrant in fulfilling her child
support obligations and has been jailed on several occasions for
non-payment. Also, in 2001, she was convicted of theft of property
for stealing money and cellular phone from her brother “to trade for
drugs.” In addition, she was arrested on January 18, 2007 in
Williamson County on felony vehicle theft charge. She is currently
on bond and awaiting trial on March 20, 2006. 278

276. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with
author).
277. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2004) (“Family
responsibilities that are complied with may be relevant to the determination of the
amount of restitution or fine.”).
278. Sentencing Memorandum (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2007) (on file with
author).
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CONCLUSION
The enormous volume of criminal defendants who enter guilty
pleas combined with Booker’s widening of judicial sentencing
discretion make mitigation investigation in non-capital cases more
critical than ever. However, despite the unprecedented demand for
effective advocacy, few non-capital defense counsel possess the skill,
resources, or time to conduct intensive investigation or put forth
innovative mitigation presentations.
To respond to this need, law school criminal defense clinics offer
an ideal arena to introduce mitigation-intensive advocacy. As a
“theory for practice,” techniques used by capital mitigation specialists
are especially instructive. First, a model drawn from capital
mitigation investigation advances several longstanding goals of
clinical education. In addition, as the “very depth of the involvement”
of live client representation “can be debilitating” for student-attorneys,
such a model offers structure and guidance in the complex area of
mitigation investigation. 279 Further, a clinical model based on capital
mitigation investigation can help student-attorneys to develop a
comparable protocol for later use in practice. Most critically, the
implementation of capital mitigation techniques in criminal defense
clinics will enable student-attorneys to better advocate for outcomes
that reflect the dignity, humanity, and individuality of every client.

279. Jennifer Howard, Learning to ‘Think Like a Lawyer’ Through
Experience, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 167, 180 (1995) (quoting Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical
Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from
Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284,
287 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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